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Abstract. In the article I reconstruct Karol Wojtyła’s argument against atheism. 
According to Wojtyła, an  atheist is unjust because of not rendering absolute 
honour to God. In my opinion the argument is sound if one applies it to theists 
or negative atheists (but not to positive atheists) and if one presupposes that 
there are moral obligations to only supposed persons. The argument meets 
some objections (amongst others, the problems of multiplying obligations and 
the inability of an atheist giving honour to God). A discussion of them leads me 
to an interpretation of the theism-atheism controversy as being the conflict of 
two imperatives: the imperative of justice and the imperative of evidence.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS1
Theism and atheism are not only philosophical doctrines, but also 
opposing ways of life and of knowing the world.2 Despite significant 
discrepancies, they probably share some common moral and epistemic 
1 This paper was presented at the conference ‘Epistemology of Atheism’ (Lorraine, 
June 2013). I thank all the participants of this conference – especially Paul Clavier, John 
Greco, Piotr Gutowski, Dariusz Łukasiewicz, Cyrille Michon, Roger Pouivet, Sebastien 
Rehault, and John Schellenberg – for their interesting critical remarks that helped me to 
improve (at least partly) my text.
2 Theism as a philosophical doctrine claims that there is exactly one (metaphysically) 
ultimate, transcendent, personal and (morally) good being called God. The content of 
this doctrine can be extended or reduced. Therefore atheism can be understood strictly 
as a negation of this doctrine as a whole or as a negation of any its variety or part. The 
above distinction is significant for understanding practical theism and atheism, which 
are the ways of life with or without the relationship to God. My article deals with theism 
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principles (imperatives). In cases where those principles conflict, theists 
and atheists differ in preferences as to the priority of one of the principles 
over the others. In this text, I  will show this difference in preferences 
taking as an example the principle of justice, or the moral imperative of 
justice (MIJ), and the principle of evidence, or the epistemic imperative 
of justification (EIJ). I will attempt to show how the understanding and 
the position of those imperatives affect one of the aspects in the debate 
between theism and atheism.
The starting point of my considerations will be an  intriguing essay 
by a  Polish philosopher, Karol Wojtyła (1983/1958), later known as 
Pope John Paul II.3 In this article, he defends the claim that an atheist 
violates the (classically understood) principle of justice. After presenting 
Wojtyła’s argument and rendering it more precise (sections II, III), I will 
show its premises related to the Thomistic concept of justice and religion 
(section IV). Next, I  will consider an  objection that may be raised 
against Wojtyła’s argument (section V). This discussion will lead me to 
the interpretation of the theism vs. atheism controversy as the conflict 
between MIJ and EIJ (section VI). The analyses – which I will perform 
in sections VII-IX  – of those imperatives (and their presuppositions) 
and of different varieties of atheism (and theism) will prove useful in the 
clarification of the controversy and in the assessment of Wojtyła’s claim. 
Finally, I accept it with a modification, overcoming further objections 
against it and indicating cultural consequences of the decline in the 
attitude of religious reverence (section X and conclusion).
II. THE ORIGINAL VERSION OF WOJTYŁA’S ARGUMENT
Below I present the original version of Wojtyła’s argument, making a list 
of quotations from his article (1983/1958). I put them in the order that 
represents the course of argument that may be attributed to Wojtyła.
(W1) ‘To be just means to render what is due to a person [...]. Showing 
respect to the rights of persons who do not clearly and tangibly strive for 
it is a particular manifestation of justice.’ (p. 109)
and atheism in the strict sense, however, after introducing the necessary changes, my 
argument can be applied to their reduced versions.
3 Wojtyła’s article cited here was written in 1957-1958. At the time, Wojtyła was 
a  lecturer in ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin. All quotations from Wojtyła’s 
text are in my translation from the original Polish.
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(W2) ‘Reason alone leads man to the conclusion of the existence of 
the First Cause, which is the first being, i.e. God.’ (p.107)
(W3) ‘If God is the First Cause to which everything, and thus also 
man, owes its existence, therefore it is man, as a  creature capable of 
knowing this truth, that should bring it to expression in his life [...].’ 
(p. 107)
(W4) ‘Doing this, he fulfils the elementary duty of justice.’ (p. 107)
(W5) ‘If he does not do it, he offends justice.’ (p. 107)
(W6 – conclusion) ‘[An atheistic attitude] is ex definitione devoid of 
an [essential] manifestation of justice.’ (p. 107)
(W1) is a  quasi definition of justice. (W2) is an  epistemological-
ontological claim concerning the existence of God and the attainability 
of the rational knowledge of it. (W3) is a  deontic consequence of the 
application of the quasi-definition (W1) to God whose existence is stated 
in claim (W2). From this consequence Wojtyła derives the evaluative 
statements: (W4) and (W5). The latter leads him to the conclusion (W6) 
on the injustice of an atheist’s attitude.4
III. A RECONSTRUCTION OF WOJTYŁA’S ARGUMENT
Wojtyła’s presentation of the argument is clear but informal and inexact. 
It is possible to give it a more precise form. Here is a proposal of how to 
do this.5
Let the variable x represent an element in the set of people. Let us 
assume the following definition (equivalence).
4 Wojtyła’s article (and the above reasoning) does not directly concern the attitude 
of atheism, but the independent ethics proposed by an  eminent Polish philosopher-
atheist Tadeusz Kotarbiński; he believed that moral norms should be derived from 
sources independent of religion (and worldview). According to Wojtyła, Kotarbiński’s 
independent ethics is ‘natural ethics’, or even ‘Christian ethics’, ‘minus all that refers 
to God in it’ (1983/1958: 106). Thus it is no wonder that such ethics does not include 
norms regulating the relationships between man and God, which makes it poorer ‘by one 
justice’ (Wojtyła 1983/1968: 110). A person acting upon such ethics would in practice 
assume an atheistic attitude, which to Wojtyła is unjust by nature.
5 Assigning symbols to the steps of the original reasoning of Wojtyła, I used the letter 
‘W’ (from the first letters of his name). Now I am using letters ‘WW’ (from the first letter 
of Wojtyła’s name and the first letter of my name). The argument could obviously be 
formulated even more precisely, but I would not like to let my care for its correctness blur 
its clarity and simplicity. I also do not address the question of the relationship between 
indicative and normative statements.
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(WW1) x is just iff x renders each person what is due to him or her.
Note that a person’s due mentioned in the definition refers also to God 
(if this person exists):
(WW2) Absolute honour is due to God as the Creator of the world 
and the highest and the best person.
So we can accept the following implication:
(WW3) If x is just, then x renders (also) absolute honour to God.
Performing a transposition, we obtain:
(WW4) If x does not render (also) absolute honour to God, then x is 
not just.
Because atheism consists, in practice, in not rendering honour to God, 
a person of whom the antecedent of this implication holds true may be 
called an atheist.6 Thus we are entitled to say that
(WW5) An atheist does not render absolute honour to God.
From (WW4) and (WW5) we infer, according to modus ponendo ponens, 
the conclusion:
(WW6) An atheist is not (in full) just.
The above argument presupposes the thesis of the existence of 
(a personal and good) God. If we accept this thesis, the argument can 
help us to understand the practical consequences of theoretical theism 
(see footnote 6). What if we do not accept this thesis? In this case we can 
state an objection that the argument can be sound only for theists (who 
have justified their theism). This problem will be developed in section V.
IV. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE ARGUMENT AGAINST 
THE BACKGROUND OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS’ CONCEPTION
Wojtyła’s argument rests on two presuppositions: (WW1) – the definition 
of justice, and (WW2) – the thesis about honour being due to God. I will 
6 A  theoretical theist may also be a  practical atheist, as it is possible to accept the 
thesis of the existence of God without rendering Him honour. Such an attitude, however, 
is inconsistent. Similarly, combining theoretical atheism with practical theism does not 
seem consistent (contrary to some philosophers of religion). We will return to this issue 
in further considerations, introducing additional distinctions.
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attempt to elucidate them in the context of St. Thomas Aquinas’ views to 
which Wojtyła seems to refer.
Aquinas defines justice as follows (ST: 2a2ae, Q58, a1):
[...] justitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua 
voluntate jus suum unicuique tribuit (‘justice is the habit whereby 
a person with a lasting and constant will renders to each his due’).
This definition of justice – referring, among others, to Aristotle – presents 
it as a  virtue that consists in maintaining appropriate proportions in 
relationships with other persons. The basis for those relationships may 
be, among others, a  position those persons hold in relation to us in 
a hierarchy. The principle of rendering each his due is quite well rooted 
in our moral intuitions, although it may be interpreted and applied in 
various ways.
Aquinas applies this principle, among others, to the ‘man  – God’ 
relationship. He is entitled to do this, because he holds a conviction (in 
his own opinion, legitimate and true!) that there exists the personal God. 
A variety of justice that refers to God he calls religion. Religion consists 
in rendering due honour to God (‘paying [reddere honorem debitum] the 
debt of honour to God’ (ST: 2a2ae, Q81, a2) or ‘giving due honour to 
God’ (ST: 2a2ae, Q81, a4)).
The ground for the binding force of the virtue (obligation) of religion 
is, according to St. Thomas, the highest position of God in the hierarchy 
of beings. Thus, if the criterion of whether honour is due to someone 
is this person’s ‘superiority’ (excellentia – excellence) in relation to the 
one who gives honour (e.g. a father in relation to his son or a king to his 
subject), then special – highest – honour is due to God, because
‘God infinitely surpasses and completely transcends all other things, his 
excellence is unparalleled.’ (ST: 2a2ae, Q81, a4)
It is worth noting that St. Thomas infers the obligation of rendering 
(absolute) honour to God from His highest (absolute) ontic position, 
while Wojtyła (see above II W3) stresses the moment of gratitude to 
God for giving man the gift of existence. The two approaches can be 
reconciled and accepted under the following conditions:
(i) the absolute superiority of God over other beings is the consequence 
of (or is meaningfully related to) the fact that He is their creator;
(ii) creating something ex nihilo is the fundamental (primary, border-
line) good or the paradigmatic form of goodness  – without it 
nothing (except God) could achieve any good;
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(iii) it is admissible (by analogy or metaphor) to regard the fact of 
having received existence from God as a gift or a present, although 
(as a contemporary brilliant critic of theism has put it) if A is to 
make a gift to B, then A and B must both already exist (Everitt 
2004: 130).7
As we can see, both (WW1) and (WW2) can be clarified and defended 
in the context of the classic, and rather trustworthy, philosophical 
conceptions. Despite this, an  atheist can easily raise a  very serious 
objection against the discussed reasoning.
V. AN ATHEIST’S OBJECTION AND WOJTYŁA’S RESPONSE
Wojtyła (1983/1958: 107-108) realized that such an  objection can be 
made and reconstructed it (as it were, on behalf of an  atheist) in the 
following way:
[...] I may be just or unjust only in relation to someone who really exists; 
because I am not convinced about the real existence of God, therefore 
it is out of the question for me to commit an  injustice to Him. Only 
a person who has [...] the belief that God exists [...] may be guilty of such 
an injustice.
In other words: the obligation to render honour to God concerns only 
those who accept the thesis of His existence. Thus the above reasoning is 
conclusive, but refers only to people who have theistic beliefs but do not 
follow their practical consequences (determined in the context of quite 
universally accepted moral principles). The reasoning, however, does not 
concern people whose system of beliefs can be qualified as atheism.
Wojtyła answers (1983/1958: 108-109) by stating that for the cited 
objection to be valid, ‘it should be first [...] irrefutably proved’ that God 
does not exist (and that ‘man is an independent being’). He also suggests 
that such a ‘proof ’ has never been given, since ‘so many people, both very 
simple and very educated’ are convinced of the existence of God, while 
others ‘cannot with complete certainty reject the existence of God, but 
to greater or lesser extent reckon with His possibility’. Because of these 
doubts, an atheist is morally obliged to ask the following question:
7 Let us observe that in many cultures of the world there is a deeply rooted obligation 
of gratitude to parents for the gift of life, despite the above semantic difficulty (and 
despite the fact that the recipient of that ‘gift’ – sometimes a difficult or painful one – has 
not asked for it).
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Yet, am I not unjust towards the Being of whose existence so many people 
are deeply convinced? Just like a person of a subtle, delicate conscience 
is anxious not to harm even his unknown fellow human beings, even 
unconsciously. (Wojtyła 1983/1958: 110)
As we can see, in his response Wojtyła attempts to limit the validity of 
the objection to a very narrow (in his opinion) group of atheists – those 
who, as a result of ‘irrefutable proof ’, are certain that God does not exist. 
He also assumes that for the obligation of rendering honour (or more 
broadly: of being just) to be binding, the conviction of the very possibility 
of God’s existence, and not of His actual existence, is sufficient. I  will 
later try to make both suggestions more precise and to discuss them. 
Before I do this, however, I will reconstruct the essence of the ‘theism 
vs. atheism’ debate, as it appears in the light of the considerations I have 
presented so far.
VI. THE NATURE OF THE VITAL CONTROVERSY 
BETWEEN THEISM AND ATHEISM
In our lives we are guided by various moral and epistemic imperatives. 
Two of them are particularly important to our issue. The first is the moral 
imperative (or principle) of justice (MIJ), which can be formulated as 
follows:
(MIJ) Render to each his due!
The second one is the epistemic imperative (or principle) of justification 
(EIJ). Let us express it by the words:
(EIJ) Accept only the beliefs for which you have sufficient justification!8
The moral imperative of honour (MIH) with which theists (religious 
people) express their obligation of justice towards God is a  particular 
variation of MIJ. This variation says:
(MIH) Render absolute honour to God!9
8 EIJ corresponds to the famous principle of evidentialism that William Clifford 
expressed in the following way: ‘it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to 
believe anything on insufficient evidence’. I do not enter here into a discussion about this 
principle’s validity. See Alvin Plantinga (2000: 67-107, esp. p. 89).
9 In order not to become entangled in cultural limitations, we can initially formulate 
MIH as follows: Render absolute honour to whoever is worthy of it! We simultaneously 
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Usually MIJ and EIJ do not conflict. However, there may arise a conflict 
between EIJ and the mentioned MIJ variation, i.e. MIH. An atheist might 
still say:
(A) I cannot fulfil MIH (MIJ in reference to God) because, in order to 
do this, I would have to accept the existence of God; then, however, 
I would violate EIJ, which is a priority imperative to me.
To such a declaration, a theist might respond as follows:
(T) The exact fulfilment of EIJ in reference to the belief concerning 
the existence of God is impossible; if ‘God infinitely surpasses 
and completely transcends all other things’, His superiority is 
incomparable, no human being can have (in a  natural way) such 
knowledge of Him as to acquire sufficient grounds to accept a belief in 
His existence;10 however, rigorous respect for EIJ in reference to God 
leads to the violation of MIH, which I consider as the fundamental 
variation of MIJ – the imperative that has priority in my life.
As we can see, in practice the ‘theism vs. atheism’ controversy is (or 
sometimes happens to be) a  controversy based on a  conflict between 
two imperatives: MIJ (MIH) and EIJ. It is no wonder that sometimes the 
attitude of atheism causes moral outrage among theists: after all, atheists 
seem to violate MIJ (MIH). On the other hand, the theistic (religious, 
cultic) attitude not infrequently makes atheists respond with what 
I would call epistemic scorn: How can one engage in any activity towards 
a person whose existence is disputed or doubtful? Such an attitude clearly 
seems to violate EIJ.
It follows from the above that the key to understanding this essential 
aspect of the ‘theism vs. atheism’ controversy is the question whether MIJ 
(MIH) and EIJ are binding. Below, I will draw attention to some problems 
related to those imperatives, which might help clarify, and perhaps 
solve or weaken the mentioned controversy (conflict). Discussing those 
assume that only a perfect (also morally perfect) person and the one that is distinguished 
from us and from the world by absolute ontic pre-eminence is worthy of such honour. 
This person is commonly called God.
10 See above section IV. We can know God only by effects of His activity, but if God 
infinitely surpasses His effects, natural knowledge about Him seems to be impossible. 
No human knowledge about God – knowledge based on the acquaintance of imperfect 
objects present in the world  – can grasp Divine essence. What is more, each attempt 
at such knowledge – as an attempt at the ‘objectification’ of God – would violate God’s 
majesty.
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problems I will use, among others, the above listed suggestions made by 
Wojtyła in his answer to an atheist’s objection.
VII. EPISTEMIC IMPERATIVE OF JUSTIFICATION
Those who accept the validity of EIJ must remember that its exact 
fulfilment encounters serious difficulties in practice. We do not have 
enough time and appropriate means to justify all our beliefs. A  great 
part of our beliefs we hold without a sufficient justification, but it would 
be difficult to dispense with them in life. We also know that different 
standards of justification  – from more rigorous to more liberal  – are 
applicable to different types of beliefs, and philosophy is an area where it 
is difficult to find irrefutable justifications and decisive criteria to settle 
disputes between conflicting beliefs.
I believe that the application of EIJ to philosophical (and worldview-
related) discussions should consist in rejecting completely unjustified 
beliefs and accepting the beliefs for which their proponents can find 
appropriate reasons. It is enough that those reasons are understandable 
and disputable to the opponent and that bringing them up for discussion 
may lead its participants to change their positions. If we accept the above 
criterion, we may find that at least some theists and some atheists respect 
EIJ with regard to the beliefs that identify them. From now, speaking 
of ‘theism/atheism’, I will refer to rational (justified in the above sense) 
theism/atheism.
VIII. TWO TYPES OF ATHEISM
In this context, it is worthwhile to cite the distinction between two types 
of atheism proposed by Michael Martin (2007: 1) in his introduction to 
The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. According to him:
 – a negative atheist is ‘someone without a belief in God; he or she 
need not be someone who believes that God does not exist’;
 – while a  positive atheist is the ‘one who believes that there is no 
God.’11
11 My reasoning is limited here in the first place to the ‘atheism in the narrow sense’, 
which refers to the theistically understood God (and not to God, or god, understood in 
any way). However, as I previously remarked, after the necessary modifications, it can 
also be applied to atheism in the wider sense.
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Martin (2007: 2) adds that
For positive atheism [...] to be successfully defended, two tasks must 
be accomplished. First, the reasons for believing in a theistic God must 
be refuted; in other words, negative atheism [...] must be established. 
Second, reasons for disbelieving in the theistic God must be given.
Applying the above distinction to MIH question, it is easy to note that 
an atheist who accomplished the above two tasks – that is, whose views 
can be qualified as justified positive atheism  – is not bound by MIH, 
because such an atheist is justified in believing that God does not exist. 
But what about a negative atheist – one that justified his rejecting the 
reasons for theistic belief (and thus justified ‘the absence of belief in 
a  personal theistic God’), but has no ‘reasons for disbelieving in the 
theistic God’ (and thus no reasons for believing that ‘there is no God’)?
IX. MORAL IMPERATIVE OF JUSTICE AND EXISTENTIAL BELIEFS
In order to answer the question whether a  negative atheist is bound 
by MIH, it is necessary to consider if there are situations where MIJ is 
binding despite the absence of belief in the existence of the person to 
whom we owe something. Since,
 – if there are situations where someone should adhere to the principle 
of justice although he is not convinced that the person towards 
whom he is obliged to act justly exists, and at the same time has no 
justified belief that this person does not exist,
 – it can be suspected that MIH is binding also for someone who is 
not convinced that God exists, although at the same time he has no 
justified belief that God does not exist.
Let us consider two situations.
(1) I am driving at night through a non-built-up area. I have no good 
reasons to assume that there is a pedestrian there at that hour. However, 
I  have no sufficient reason to exclude such a  possibility or to believe 
that there is (for certain) no pedestrian on the road. However, MIJ, or 
a similar moral principle (otherwise included in the traffic code), tells 
me to drive with caution: if it turned out that a pedestrian was walking 
along that road, I might harm him, and he has a right to inviolability.
(2) In my garden, where there are no apple-trees, I have found a large 
quantity of tasty apples. I have no sufficient reasons to believe that I was 
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given them by my neighbour (who has an apple-tree): he does not like 
me and is mean. On the other hand, I have no grounds to believe that 
the apples are not a present from my neighbour: wind would not blow all 
those apples here, and other neighbours live too far. Worse still, I have 
neither the time nor the means to make a quick inquiry into the cause 
of the presence of the apples in my garden. I believe that in this situation 
I am – according to MIJ – obliged (at least conditionally) to thank my 
neighbour for delivering apples: thanks are always due to the donor.
I believe that it is possible to multiply examples of situations where – 
as we are inclined to presume – someone has obligations, although he 
is not sufficiently convinced of the existence of the person to whom 
he is obliged.12 Both above examples, despite the difference between 
them, meet this condition. Obviously, the obligation in situation (1) 
is clearer – the danger of harming someone is the reason why not the 
belief in the existence (here and now) of a  pedestrian, but the belief 
in the very possibility of his existence constitutes a  sufficient ground 
for an obligation to certain behaviours. In the case of MIH, no one is 
harmed if this imperative is not fulfilled. There is, however, a danger of 
taking a wrong stance towards an alleged person who deserves gratitude 
or honour.
Case (2) quite closely resembles the position of a  negative atheist 
towards God. The gardener would not harm the neighbour if he did not 
thank him. What is more, the gardener is not convinced that there is 
a  donor of apples and that this donor (deserving thanks) is the same 
person as his closest neighbour. However, it seems that in view of the 
absence of sufficient reasons for the thesis that there is not a  donor 
identical with the neighbour, the gardener has a  duty to thank the 
neighbour (in some way). If he does not do it, his relationship to the 
neighbour will not be right.
Perhaps our situation in life is similar to that of the gardener. We live, 
but we cannot give the ultimate metaphysical explanation to our life. We 
12 I do not insist that cases (1) and (2) are typical and incontrovertible examples of 
such situations. They are only meant to show that there are events in life that call for 
reflection regarding whether they possibly entail obligation towards persons of whose 
existence we are not sufficiently certain. To give another example: It is generally believed 
that one should not detonate a  building if there may be people inside. The principle 
discussed here is also cited by anti-abortionists who claim that it is forbidden to destroy 
a human foetus even if we were unable to determine the precise moment when the life of 
the human person begins.
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have no proof demonstrating that our life is a gift from God. However, 
we have also no reasons to irrefutably exclude this possibility.13 If it turns 
out that this possibility obtains, and we have not rendered honour to 
God, it will also turn out that we have violated MIJ. Thus it seems that 
Wojtyła is right when he extends MIH application to people who do not 
believe in the existence of God, but (as I quoted above) ‘reckon with His 
possibility’.
X. OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS
The above analyses have led me to the thesis that MIH binds both 
theists and negative atheists, that is people who are not convinced of the 
existence of God but do not have sufficient reasons for their disbelieving 
in God. It is worthwhile to confront the claim I am defending with some 
possible objections and counterarguments.
(C1) Counterargument from multiplying obligations. If the very 
possibility of the existence of MIJ object binds us to apply the principle, 
we find ourselves in a situation of having a great number of obligations. 
This might paralyse our action: apart from being obliged to fulfil duties 
to real individuals that we know, we would be obliged to fulfil duties to 
individuals that are only supposed – including God. It is difficult to fulfil 
all those obligations efficiently.
Answer. Obviously, some limitations should be put on the validity of 
MIJ towards only supposed individuals. Perhaps such a  limitation can 
follow from establishing the probability of the belief in the existence/
nonexistence of a  given person (or the degree of probability we are 
inclined to attribute to the existence/nonexistence of a  given person), 
above/below which MIJ would not be binding. However, it is difficult to 
develop such a theory of probability, as it would have to be different for 
different types of MIJ application.
I believe that here it is enough to refer to an  intuitive sense of the 
importance of the matter: some obligations are so important that they are 
binding even in the case (like in situation (1) – see above: IX) where we 
admit only a possibility of the existence of their object; other obligations 
13 This concerns especially the variety of negative atheism that follows from 
agnosticism: the ‘position of neither believing nor disbelieving that God exists’ (because 
of a lack of ‘good reasons’ for both attitudes – sceptical agnosticism; or because of ‘equally 
good reasons’ for both reasons – cancellation agnosticism) (Martin 2007: 2-3).
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are not so important – they are binding only when the existence of their 
object is obvious. In my opinion, the obligation contained in MIH belongs 
to the first category. The fact of our life is the fundamental metaphysical 
datum; if we admit the possibility that our life is a gift of God, or remains 
in an essential relationship to God, we owe Him gratitude or honour as 
an attitude that expresses this relationship.
(C2) Counterargument from the hiddenness of God. If there are 
no reasons sufficient to incline all rational subjects to belief in God’s 
existence, then either God does not exist, or He deliberately hides 
his existence. The first case invalidates MIH, because it is impossible 
to render honour to someone who does not exist. The second case 
invalidates MIH, because the hiddenness of God indicates that He does 
not want to be known and rendered honour towards.
Answer. As to the first case. The thesis that God does not exist does 
not follow from the thesis that there are no proofs of the existence of God 
that convince everyone. Above, I attempted to show that only those who 
can demonstrate the truth of the first thesis are exempt from MIH.
As to the second case. We do not know motives for which God decided 
to remain hidden or not to reveal Himself clearly. Perhaps God wants to 
be known and honoured, but – as Wojtyła (1983/1958: 109) writes – ‘does 
not impose Himself [or does not want to impose] on man with His rights’. 
Wojtyła mentions two supposed reasons of this ‘non-imposing Himself ’: 
the unwillingness to violate human freedom (compare Swinburne 2004: 
267-272) and the lack of consent to the violation of God’s majesty (see 
above: VI. (T)).
In addition, let us observe that the fact that someone gives us a gift 
secretly or anonymously does not exempt us from the duty of gratitude. 
If we are unable to identify or find the giver, we are obliged at least to 
assume an  intentional attitude of gratitude to him. This remains valid 
also for our supposed creator.
(C3) Counterargument from evil. A negative atheist is not obliged 
to respect MIH, if he discovers in the world (or in his life) so great evil 
or such a kind of evil – created or allowed by God – that it cancels His 
deserving honour.
Answer. If the fact of evil in the world falsifies the thesis of the 
existence of a God that is good and deserves honour, then an atheist has 
sufficient reasons to be convinced that the theistic God does not exist. 
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Then, however, he is not a negative atheist, but a positive one, so MIH 
does not bind him (as I indicated above).
(C4) Counterargument from inability. It is difficult to imagine how 
a negative atheist could follow MIH in practice. If he does not believe 
in God, he is unable to perform religious practices sincerely. He might 
imitate some external religious behaviours, but without an inner attitude 
that results from determinate theistic convictions.
Answer. The situation of a negative atheist who wants to follow MIH 
in practice is difficult, but not hopeless. I suppose that there are at least 
three possible ways to give honour to God without the belief that He 
exists: by a morally good life (i.e. a life that includes moral respect to all 
beings treated as if they were God’s creatures or images); by refraining 
from the criticism of religious cult or opposition to it; by an intentional 
stance of conditional gratitude or conditional worship.
The last way could be expressed by the following prayer: ‘If God exists, 
then I worship you God!’14 This prayer seems strange, but we can find the 
analogies in some human behaviours (e.g. when we knock on the door of 
a lonely house, saying ‘if there is anyone in there, open!’). What is more, 
the fact that a negative atheist admits the truth of the antecedent of this 
implication, makes the implication valid for him.
The problem of the way of rendering honour does not concern only 
a  negative atheist. As St. Thomas Aquinas writes (ST: 2a2ae, Q81, a2, 
ad3):
It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something 
through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate 
thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established 
by Divine or human law.
Thus it is clear that a lack of rational regulations concerning the way of 
rendering honour to God allows for a certain freedom in the choice of the 
way to fulfil MIH. This freedom may be limited by conscious (rationally 
motivated) and free membership of a determined religious or cultural 
community. A negative atheist has no moral obligation to participate in 
such a community. It seems, however, that – in the light of MIH – he has 
a moral obligation to refrain from the depreciation of a public religious 
cult, if this cult does not violate an  important moral norm or lead to 
superstition. This condition, however, as Aquinas emphasizes (see ST: 
2a2ae, Q81, a5, ad3; Q92-94, esp. Q92, a1), concerns theists also.
14 N.B., I am afraid that today many nominal Christians pray in this way.
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CONCLUSION
In the present text I attempted – with the aid of philosophical arguments – 
to defend the thesis that MIH binds not only theists but also negative 
atheists (but not positive atheists). Certainly, those arguments would not 
convince everybody to the thesis I  defend. I  hope, however, that they 
enabled at least some clarification of one of the important aspects of the 
debate (conflict) between theism and atheism.
Considering the practical dimension of the controversy, it is 
also worthwhile to ask about the cultural consequences of atheism 
disseminating. I  believe the main consequence is  – speaking in the 
language assumed above – the weakening or atrophy of the attitude of 
rendering absolute honour to God. But what happens if one does not 
render absolute honour to (supposed) God? I believe that there are two 
possibilities:
 – rendering absolute honour to persons or things that do not deserve 
it (as in the totalitarian cult of power, and perhaps also in the 
consumers cult of material things or the cult of show-business 
stars in entertainment);
 – the absence of absolute honour to anyone or anything.
The evil of the cultural consequence of the first possibility is today 
universally known. Yet the evaluation of the cultural consequences of 
the second possibility remains an open issue. I doubt, however, that it 
is possible to live without the attitude of absolute reverence, without 
simultaneously falling into nihilism or value relativism.
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